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Abstract
We consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards
and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the
entire network while being densely connected among themselves.
To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board mem-
berships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the
benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It seems that the
board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are
the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany’s board
and director network. Conditional on being a board member, it is
very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board
membership becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is
overcome. We also present a simple model that describes board ap-
pointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and moni-
toring ability.
Keywords: Board and director interlocks, network core, network for-
mation, market capitalization.
1 Introduction
The interlocks of corporate boards and their directors are receiving in-
creasing interdisciplinary attention (see, e.g., Battiston andCatanzaro, 2004;
Caldarelli and Catanzaro, 2004; Conyon and Muldon, 2006; Davis et al.,
2003; Newman et al., 2001; Robins and Alexander, 2004), and current re-
search in the field of management science and organization has already
been actively addressing the impact of various corporate network struc-
tures on socio-economic outcomes, as witnessed by a number of recent
review articles devoted to the subject (see, e.g., Brass et al., 2004; Borgatti
and Foster, 2003; Galaskiewicz, 2007; Provan et al., 2007; Uzzi et al., 2007).
It is uncontroversial that board and director networks are small worlds,
i.e. they are highly clustered while exhibiting short average path lengths.
This paper addresses a somewhat different aspect of board and director
networks by focusing on the network core of board and director interlocks.
Mintz and Schwartz (1981) have argued that the degree of interest-group
formation can be assessed by some core of board interlocks. Moreover,
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Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2008) have argued theoretically that a network
core is crucial for the propagation of opinion dynamics in a generic proba-
bilistic herding model with a large number of agents, and several authors
have suggested procedures to classify or identify a core of key players in
complex networks (for a more recent take on the classic concept of core-
periphery structures in networks see, e.g., Borgatti, 2006; Borgatti and Ev-
erett, 1999; Holme, 2005).
Here we suggest a simple procedure to detect the core of board and di-
rector interlocks by comparing the actual number of board memberships
to a random benchmark given by a sequence of Bernoulli trials. The re-
sulting binomial distribution and the empirically observed distribution
display deviations over increasing orders of magnitude for multiple mem-
berships. It turns out that directors with multiple board memberships are
to a large extent connected among themselves, and exhibit high central-
ity in the overall network of director interlocks. Several directors with
multiple membership are not connected to their peers, and our analysis
suggests that board appointment decisions of largely capitalized firms are
an important factor in observing a dense core of interlocked directors with
high centrality. Thus we propose a simple model that accounts for the ob-
served conditional probabilities of multiple board membership, based on
the idea that board appointment represents a trade-off between the ben-
efits of having a well-connected director on one’s board, and the costs of
increasingly binding time constraints arising from multiple board mem-
bership.
2 The network structure of German board and
director interlocks
We collected board composition data for German publicly traded compa-
nies from their respective websites, focusing on companies which either
have a market capitalization of more than one hundred million euro, or
3
are included in one of the four prime standard indices of Deutsche Börse.1
For the purpose of our study, the board of a German publicly traded com-
pany consists of management (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichts-
rat). The resulting list is composed of n = 3, 383 directors who work for
c = 284 companies with a total market capitalization of 1.27 trillion euro
as of May 31, 2008, accounting for roughly 95% of Deutsche Börse’s over-
all market capitalization. We checked carefully that identical names refer
to the same person, which was actually not always the case, and assigned
a unique identifier to each director.
In order to construct the current bipartite graph formed by German
corporate boards, we consider the incidence matrix M of dimension n× c,
with mij = 1 if director i is on the board of company j and zero other-
wise. The one-mode projection onto directors D = MMT is the weighted
adjacency matrix of director interlocks. Its diagonal entries equal the to-
tal number of board memberships of director i, while non-zero entries off
the diagonal of D represent the weight of a link, showing on how many
boards two directors serve together.2 Symmetrically, the one-mode pro-
jection onto boards B = MTM yields the weighted adjacency matrix of
company interlocks, its diagonal entries correspond to the board size of
company j, and off-diagonal non-zero elements indicate the number of di-
rectors that two companies have in common. In order to avoid self-loops,
we always set the diagonal of adjacency matrices equal to zero. The re-
sulting networks are displayed in Figure 1.
While the small-world properties of D have been documented before
(see, e.g., Battiston and Catanzaro, 2004; Newman et al., 2001), several au-
thors have pointed out that this might be a misleading way to approach
the complexity of director interlocks. Conyon and Muldon (2006) argue
that high clustering in director networks occurs by construction because
1The four prime standard indices are the DAX, the MDAX, the TecDAX, and the
SDAX. The DAX is comprised of the top thirty companies ranked by market capitaliza-
tion. The SDAX andMDAX refer to small cap andmid-cap companies, while the TecDAX
consists of the thirty largest companies in the technology sector.
2Directors who form links with weight greater than unity are sometimes referred to as
a lobby.
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directors who serve on the same board form a complete graph. They show
that a constrained random graph, which accounts for the number of com-
plete subgraphs, is in line with the observed graph of director interlocks,
implying that boards of directors are no more clubby than would be ex-
pected in a chance experiment. But they do find that positive degree corre-
lation (or assortativity) is an unexpected characteristic among interlocking
directors who serve on many boards; or as Newman et al. (2001) slangly
put it, “bigshots run with other bigshots.” Similarly, Robins and Alexan-
der (2004) investigate deviations of what they term ‘infrastructures’ from
a constrained random benchmark, where infrastructures account for the
fact that every company (in the large connected component) has at least
one interlocker, and that each interlocker is at least on two boards. They
conclude as well that more boards than expected choose a high number
of directors with external linkages. Our approach is quite similar in spirit
to those of Conyon and Muldon (2006) and Robins and Alexander (2004)
because we also focus on deviations from a random benchmark after real-
izing that the vast majority of directors serves on a single board.
In contrast to their approaches, we do not start from the immediate
topological features of the bipartite graph or its respective one-mode pro-
jections. Instead we begin by realizing that nearly 92% of directors (3,102
out of 3,383) serve on a single board, which we henceforth label as the
“one-director-one-seat” principle.3 The sample consists of a total of 3,773
board positions, which leaves 390 positions to be filledwithmultiple board
memberships from the pool of 3,383 directors. To establish a random
benchmark of multiple board membership, we assume that all directors
in the sample are unconditionally indistinguishable among themselves af-
ter accounting for the 1-director-1-seat principle. Then we can determine
the probability of observing multiple board membership as a sequence of
k = 390 independent Bernoulli trials, resulting in a binomial distribution
3Notice that 89% of directors in the large connected component conform with the 1-
director-1-seat principle. For the purpose of identifying deviations in orders of magni-
tude, the difference in the relative frequency of single board membership between the
entire network and the large connected component does not matter.
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Figure 2: The solid curve shows the relative frequency of multiple board
membership, while the dashed curve illustrates the binomial probability
of observing multiple board membership in an independent sequence of
k = 390 Bernoulli trials with probability p = 1/3383 of success. The semi-
log scale reveals deviations on increasing orders of magnitude for b > 3.
for observing B = b additional board memberships,
Pr[B = b] =
(
k
b
)
pb (1− p)k−b,
where p = 1/n ≈ 3× 10−4 is the probability of success, i.e. of obtaining
an additional board membership. Figure 2 illustrates the result and com-
pares it to the empirically observed relative frequencies of multiple board
membership.
At least for b ≥ 4, the incidence of multiple board membership is sev-
eral orders of magnitude higher than we would expect in a sequence of
independent Bernoulli trials. If the network of director interlocks is in-
deed assortative, then focusing on directors that serve on an unexpectedly
large number of boards should conveniently identify a core of key players.
Figure 3 displays the network structure among directors with B ≥ b board
memberships, and already visually confirms that the resulting subgraphs,
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which we label as B-cores, are to a very large extent connected.4 The den-
sity of the (unweighted version of) graph D is given by the ratio of the
existing number of links |L| to the number of links in a complete graph of
the same size, denoted |N|,
densityD = 2|L|/|N|(|N| − 1),
which is by construction confined to the interval [0, 1]. Table 1 illustrates
that the density of B-core subgraphs increases with b, so core directors are
more densely connected among their core peers compared to the average
director in the network.
Let C denote the adjacency matrix of the large connected component
of D, and let V denote the set of directors contained in C. A shortest path
between two directors u, v ∈ V is known as a graph geodesic, which is not
necessarily unique, and the length of the geodesic dC(u, v) is known as
the graph distance between the pair (u, v). The eccentricity of node u is the
maximum graph distance between u and any other node v. The maximum
eccentricity is the graph diameter, and the minimum graph eccentricity is
the graph radius. We can see from Table 1 that the radius and diameter
of B-cores decrease with b, as one intuitively desires in the definition of a
core. We also compute two simple measures of centrality in order to in-
vestigate whether directors in the increasing sequence of B-cores show an
increasing centrality in the entire network C. The simplest measure of the
centrality of node u is degree centrality, constructed by summing the num-
ber of links that each node has, degreeu = ∑v∈V Cuv. Intuitively, directors
who have many links compared to their peers are in an advantageous po-
sition if they are able to influence many of their peers, or if they have
better access to resources through their many links. But degree centrality
only takes immediate ties of directors into account, and lacks information
about the distance to directors that are not immediate neighbors. More-
over, directors with many board memberships have a relatively large de-
4Notice that our notion of B-cores is different from the concept of k-cores, which are
constructed using a node’s minimum degree (see, e.g., Seidman, 1983).
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b = 2 b = 3
b = 4b = 5
Figure 3: Network structures formed by considering directors with an in-
creasing threshold of board memberships B ≥ b. The fractions of directors
that are not part of the respective connected components are (clockwise
from top left) 7.5%, 6.9%, 3.9%, and 11.1%. The B-6 core forms a com-
plete graph of size two. Notice that for b ≥ 3 all directors are in the large
connected component of D shown in the left panel of Figure 1.
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gree by construction since the board size distribution has a characteristic
scale that is well captured by its mean. Closeness centrality, on the other
hand, aims at measuring the distance of a node to all other nodes in the
network, and is typically defined as the reciprocal of the sum of geodesics
to all other nodes in the network,
closenessu = 1/ ∑
v∈V
dC(u, v) .
To normalize the closeness measure, we divide by the closeness score of
the director with maximal closeness centrality. Directors who are more
central in this sense should in principle be better able to reach out into
the entire network or be faster in doing so. Third, we also compute the
eigenvector centrality (see, e.g., Bonacich, 1972) for all nodes in V. Eigen-
vector centrality assigns scores of relative importance to directors in the
network, based on the principle that connections to high-scoring directors
contributemore to a director’s score than equal connections to low-scoring
peers. Hence the idea behind eigenvector centrality is that the quality of
links is important, because directors who are connected to many influ-
ential peers can be expected to be important themselves. Suppose the
eigenvector centrality score of node u, denoted eu, is proportional to the
centrality score of its neighbors,
eu =
1
λ ∑v∈V
Cuv ev ,
where λ is a constant. Then we can write the vector of centrality scores
in matrix notation as λe = C · e, which shows that e is an eigenvector
of C with corresponding eigenvalue λ. It is convenient to consider the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of C since its elements
are all non-negative according to the Perron-Frobenius theorem. As in
the case of closeness centrality, we divided all scores by the maximum
score. Table 1 shows that core directors are not only densely connected
among themselves, but that they are also increasingly central in the entire
network, which is another characteristic that one intuitively expects in the
10
Table 1: Various characteristics of B-cores and their respective directors.
The notation b = 1 refers to all directors in the large connected component
C.
b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 b = 4 b = 5 b = 6
B-core statistics:
Diameter 11 9 6 4 3 1
Radius 6 5 3 2 2 1
Density .005 .037 .126 .255 .444 1
Centrality averages:
Degree centrality 20.6 42.5 68.3 91.4 110.6 131
Closeness centrality 0.68 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.99
Eigenvector centrality 0.06 0.17 0.33 0.49 0.70 0.75
MarketCap averages:
Entire B-core 525 4,322 14,875 35,929 77,564 144,910
B-core isolates N/A 871 1,785 4,594 8,070 N/A
definition of a network core.
It is also informative to look at the B-core directors that are not con-
nected with their peers in the respective B-cores. As it turns out, the av-
erage market capitalization per director is about one order of magnitude
higher for directors that are connected in the respective B-cores. More-
over, the isolated directors in the respective cores typically serve on the
boards of companies that are sectorally close in terms of their two-digit
SIC classification, which is generally not the case for connected core direc-
tors. Consider for instance Fritz Vahrenholt and Robert J. Koehler, who are
the isolated directors in the B-4 and B-5 cores: Vahrenholt works for Nord-
deutsche Affinerie (33), ErSol Solar Energy (36), REpower Systems (35),
and Vereinigte BioEnergie Veribo (28), where the numbers in parentheses
correspond to the two-digit SIC classification of their primary activities.
The company names readily reveal a focus on energy production from
11
renewable resources.5 Similarly, Koehler works for Demag Cranes (35),
Heidelberger Druckmaschinen (35), Lanxess (28), Pfleiderer (32), and SGL
Carbon (36), which focus on the production of chemically, electronically,
or mechanically complex manufacturing goods. Very similar pictures of
sectoral or industry specificity in board membership arise for the isolated
directors in lower B-cores.
3 Modeling multiple board membership
So far we have argued that the unconditional probability of observing a
given number of board memberships provides a convenient way to detect
core structures in the network of German director interlocks. The network
features and the level of market capitalization in the B-core sequence indi-
cate some hierarchical principle of organization in the network structure of
board and director interlocks. A simple approach to multiple board mem-
bership is to consider it as the outcome of hiring or appointment decisions
concerning new board members. Hence one would like to understand the
rationale underlying board appointment decisions that are mirrored in the
degree of board membership.
In a first approximation, we start by considering the conditional prob-
ability P(b|b− 1) of serving on b boards, calculated as the fraction of di-
rectors who remain in the increasing sequence of B-cores (Figure 4). One
could also think of these conditional probabilities as reflections of a direc-
tor’s chances to climb up in the hierarchy of the director network, but from
a causal viewpoint we prefer to conceptualize the conditional probabili-
ties as the outcome of a recruitment process for new board members. The
conditional probabilities in Figure 4 display a parabolic shape that is con-
cave to the origin. The parabolic shape of P(b|b− 1) suggests a trade-off
between benefits and increasingly prohibitive costs that establish a clear
limit on the potential number of board memberships. Interestingly, this
5To be precise, the name Norddeutsche Affinerie does not readily imply a focus on
alternative resources, but their main line of business concerns the copper value chain,
which is a crucial resource in the production of renewable energy technologies.
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Figure 4: The conditional probability P(b|b − 1) of board membership is
calculated from the ratio of successive B-core sizes; for instance, 72 of the
281 directors in the B-2 core form the B-3 core, and the conditional prob-
ability P(3|2) of observing b = 3 memberships is 72/281 = 25.6%. While
the conditional probability of board membership increases at first, the fit-
ted parabolic shape indicates that the number of board appointments per
director is obviously limited.
limit is markedly below the recently introduced legal limit on board mem-
berships. According to German law (§ 100(2) of Aktiengesetz), a director
cannot serve on more than ten boards in Germany. In fact, the actual legal
limit is even higher, because up to five board memberships in conglom-
erates or parent companies are excluded from the maximum rule of ten,
showing that the observed maximum number of memberships is clearly
below the legally permitted one. We take the position that existing multi-
ple membership represents an important factor in the appointment deci-
sion. On one hand, the number of existing memberships serves as a proxy
for the social capital of a prospective candidate, and speaks in favor of
the candidate being appropriately skilled and equipped for taking on the
responsibility of board membership. On the other hand, multiple board
membership also implies that the prospective candidate faces serious time
constraints that we interpret as a cost in the hiring committee’s decision,
since directors who serve on multiple boards will find increasingly less
13
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Figure 5: The costs and benefits of existing board membership in director
appointment decisions.
time to competently carry out their services and duties.
Suppose that the conditional probability of multiple board member-
ship is such that it depends on the costs and benefits of existing member-
ship in the following fashion,
P(b+ 1|b) = p0 + α [ f (b)− g(b)] ,
where p0, α are normalization parameters, while f (b) > 0 and g(b) > 0
respectively denote the benefits and costs associated with appointing a
board member who already serves on b boards. Provided that f and g
are everywhere differentiable in the interval b ∈ [bL, bU], it seems rea-
sonable to assume that both benefits and costs are monotonically increas-
ing in b, and that there exists a point bM at which the marginal benefit
equals the marginal cost of appointing a director with bM memberships,
d f (bM)/db = dg(bM)/db. At low b the benefits of appointing a well-
connected director outweigh the costs, and d f (b)/db > dg(b)/db for
all bL ≤ b ≤ bM, but due to time constraints the costs become increas-
ingly prohibitive as b gets larger such that dg/db → ∞ for b > bU, while
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d f/db < ∞ for b > bU, hence d f (b)/db dg(b)/db for all bM < b ≤ bU.
A graphical representation of this simple argument is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.
There are, of course, other potential mechanisms underlying the ex-
istence of benefits and costs in board appointment decisions. A recent
strand of research emphasizes the interplay between the hiring of exec-
utives or directors and the agency problems among different stakehold-
ers like managers, employees, shareholders, etc. (see, e.g., Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Tirole, 2001). Inside directors
could have an incentive to resist employee lay-offs, but also to keep on
ineffective managers against the interests of shareholders or institutional
investors. Abe and Shimizutani (2007), for instance, find that board com-
position between inside and outside directors has a significant influence
on the willingness of boards to remove excess employment. Similarly,
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) have argued from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive that insiders have an incentive to protect incumbent employees at
the expense of outside interests. Naturally, directors with multiple board
membership are outsiders,6 and our simple cost-benefit approach could be
adapted to an agency view by considering f as the benefit to shareholder
interests stemming from the appointment of increasingly “reputable” out-
side directors, and g as the increasingly prohibitive opposition of insiders
against the appointment of outside directors.
After all, and irrespective of a particular mechanism, the unexpected
finding is that the limit on observed board membership is well below the
legally binding limit, which speaks in favor of the hypothesis that eco-
nomic constraints are of crucial importance in board appointment deci-
sions. Research into the exact nature of these constraints is probably a
worthwhile task in organization theory.
6According to Germany’s co-determination laws (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), half of the
directors on large corporate boards are elected employee representatives or trade union
members. However, trade union guidelines limit board membership to two positions
per union representative, thus it is fairly safe to assume that directors with three or more
memberships represent “outsiders.”
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4 Conclusion
We tend to agree with Conyon and Muldon (2006) that the routinely used
comparison of clustering coefficients and average path lengths versus a
random graph benchmark is not overly useful in the context of board and
director interlocks, which exhibit a high degree of clustering by construc-
tion. Starting from a random benchmark of multiple board membership,
we were able to identify a small core in the network of director interlocks.
Core agents turn out to be densely connected among themselves, to be
highly central in the entire network, and to work for companies with a
relatively large market capitalization. Therefore it seems reasonable to as-
sume that these directors, in spite of their small number relative to the
overall network size, exert a disproportionate degree of influence in the
network. The hierarchical nature of the director network is also important
from the viewpoint of probabilistic herding models, such as the one stud-
ied by Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2008), because the hierarchical structure
of the network can generate system-wide conformity in agents’ opinions
irrespective of the size of the network, including the possibility that the
social interaction of core agents leads to the propagation of “animal spir-
its” across an entire system that is several orders of magnitude larger than
the size of the core.
While it is probably true that core actors have considerable influence
in the shaping of economic policy, and society in general, we would like
to point out that one does not need a mighty conspirator who intention-
ally organizes the network of director interlocks into a hierarchical core-
periphery structure. Initial positive feedbacks in our simple cost-benefit
approach to board appointment decisions would explain the observed
conditional probabilities of multiple board membership, which appear as
an important force behind the existence of a small network core in di-
rector interlocks. In our opinion, it would be interesting to simulate the
evolution of director interlocks under the assumption that the probabil-
ity of board appointment, i.e. the linking probability, is proportional to
the director-associated market capitalization. If such a procedure indeed
16
replicates the core feature of director interlocks, one obtains a hierarchical
structure without intentional design.
Finally, the fact that the overwhelming majority of directors who serve
on many boards do so at largely capitalized companies is potentially use-
ful information for researchers subscribing to an agency point of view.
Moreover, policymakers and legislatorsmight want to reconsider the limit
on the number of legally permitted boardmemberships because, for one, it
appears that economic constraints limit empirically observed board mem-
bership well below the legal limit anyway, while on the other hand, the
multiple memberships that we do observe all coincide at companies with
large market capitalization. After all, fifteen board memberships at com-
panies with low market capitalization probably create much less pressure
group influence than five memberships at the very largest companies, par-
ticularly if fellow directors at these companies in turn also serve on several
other largely capitalized companies, as we observe in our sample.
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